INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY: Lesson 11 The Nature of God

Having proved the existence of God by his famous “five ways” (1.2), St Thomas proceeds to the topic of the nature of God.

He discusses the simplicity of God (1.3), the perfections of God (1.4-1.26), and the divine Persons (1.27-1.43) in turn.

We will be looking today at 1.3, the section on divine simplicity.

Part 1 Divine simplicity

What is the doctrine of divine simplicity?

It is the teaching that God is not a composite (does not have “parts”).

Every existing thing has

(a) a nature (what)

(b) an individuating principle (who)

(c) existence (that)

The doctrine of divine simplicity states that these are all the same in God.

What God is is who God is is that God is.

There's more to it. We'll get there.

A man is a composite.

An man is distinct from his nature and his existence.
The nature of the man tells us what he is.
It does not tell us who he or that he is.
Why not? and why not?

An angel is less of a composite.

An angel is identical with he nature but distinct from his existence.
The nature of the angel tells us what he is and also who he is.
It does not tell us that he is.
Why not?

God is not a composite at all.

God is identical with his nature and existence.
The nature of God tells us what he is, who he is, and that he is.

God is absolutely simple.

God is identical to his nature and his existence.
God is identical to each of his attributes, his knowledge, power etc.
And each of these is identical with each other.

We have our attributes. They are distinct from us. (Our attributes can change.)

God does not, properly speaking, have his attributes. They are not distinct from him.

Now that we have the basic idea. Let’s take a look at the text.

Summa Theologica 1.3 has eight articles. I will cover four of them.

1.3.1 Whether God is a body?
1.3.3 Whether God is the same as his essence or nature?
1.3.4 Whether nature and existence are the same in God?
1.3.7 Whether God is altogether simple?

Whether God is a body? (1.3.1)

What is a body has potentiality.
The first cause cannot have potentiality.
God is the first cause.
Therefore, God is not a body?

(Recalling the First Way (1.2.3)… In order to explain changes (from potentiality to actuality) we need a cause which is not itself actualized but is purely actual.)

Whether God is the same as his essence or nature? (1.3.3)

What is distinct from its nature is so by virtue of its material component.
God does not have a material component.
Therefore, God is identical to his nature.

(What differentiates you from other human beings. Hint: It’s not your nature.)

(Notice that this argument applies equally to angels.)

Whether nature and existence are the same in God? (1.3.4)

If God’s existence were distinct from his nature, God would be caused.
The first cause cannot be caused.
God is the first cause.
Therefore, God’s existence is identical to his nature.

Whether God is altogether simple? (1.3.7)

Every composite thing has a cause.
The first cause cannot have a cause.
God is the first cause.
Therefore, God is not a composite.

(The parts of a composite thing are prior to the thing.)

(Every composite thing depends on the composition of its parts.)

Every composite has potentiality.
The first cause cannot have potentiality.
God is the first cause.
Therefore, God is not a composite.

(Every composite thing can, at minimum, be divided.)

(Also, every composite thing is one whose nature is distinct from its existence.)

Review

What is the doctrine of divine simplicity?

Why does St Thomas believe that God is simple?

Pat 2 Speaking about God

Divine simplicity (Classical Theism) vs. Theistic Personalism

The theistic personalist views God as like us but with maximized perfections.

God is wise like us but maximally…

Divine simplicity has important implications for how we understand God.

We predicate certain things of God.

God is wise.
God is good.
God is powerful.

Moreover, we mean to speak truly of God when doing so.

We apply the same predicate terms also when speaking of creatures.

This man is wise.
This man is good.
This man is powerful.

Again, we mean to speak truly of creatures when doing so.

Do we use these terms univocally when applying them to God and to creatures.

Do they have the same sense?

Or do we use them equivocally?

Do they have a wholly different sense?

St Thomas argues that neither should be said.

They should not be thought to have the same sense.

When we apply such a term to a creature we mean to signify something that is distinct from that creature…
When we apply the same term to God, we do not mean to signify something that is distinct from God…
Hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. (1.13.5)

Nor should they be thought to have a wholly different sense.

Neither… are terms applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense. If they were, nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. (1.13.5)

What is the right relationship?

Metaphor

Jesus is a shepherd.

Simile

Jesus is like a shepherd.

Analogy

Jesus is to us as a shepherd is to his sheep.

A metaphor says that one thing is something else to make a point about it.

“Thy word is a lamp unto my feet.” (Psalms 119)

My brother can be a real bear in the morning!

It might be said that, when we speak of God, we do so metaphorically.

We sometimes do use metaphors when speaking of God.

God is a mighty fortress.

But metaphorical statements are not meant to be taken as true.

We do not suppose that God is a building.

But we often do mean to say true things about God. We do mean that…

God is wise, God is good, God is alive, God is unchangeable, etc.

Nor can it be said that we mean to use simile.

We do not mean to say that God is like a wise man or like a good thing.
We mean to say that he is wise and that he is good.

St Thomas: We apply terms to God and to creatures analogically.

The term ‘analogy’ is used by St Thomas in a specialized sense.

It lies somewhere between univocity and equivocity.

In analogies… a term used in a different sense signifies various relations to the one thing… Healthy is said of medicine, and of urine, and of the body. ‘Healthy’ is thus used in different but not unrelated senses. Medicine is called healthy because it is the cause of the health of the body. Healthy urine is called healthy because it is the sign of that health. (1.13.5)

‘Healthy’ is thus used in different senses but not radically different senses.

There is a primary referent and there are secondary referents.

We can apply the same words to God and to creatures because creatures are his creations.

A cause gives something of what it has to its effects…
God is simple. We are composite…
What he has exists in him unitedly…
What we have from him exists in us dividedly and, so, falls short of what he has.
What we have is not what God has but it’s not unrelated to what God has.

Do the terms ‘wise,’ ‘good,’, ‘powerful,’ etc. apply properly to God or to us?

As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and less properly to creatures. But as regards their meaning, they do not properly apply to God; for their meaning (our idea) is that which applies to creatures. (1.13.3)

St Thomas here distinguishes here between sense and reference.

The sense of a term is the concept or idea that the term has.
The referent of a term is what it signifies in reality.
The sense and reference of a term can differ.

‘The morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ differ in sense.

But they do not differ in reference.

Each is the planet Venus.

Let’s apply this.

In this life we know God through creatures.
And so we name him from creatures. (1.13.1)
The names we use properly belong to God and only derivatively to us, although in meaning, they fall short of God and apply properly to us.

So, when we say that God is wise we are speaking analogically.

Wisdom belongs properly to God and not properly to us.
But our idea of wisdom applies properly to what we have and not to God.
We have something that is related to wisdom but which falls short of it.

A difficulty arises…

When we apply terms to God, we cannot but think of what we have.
But what we have falls short of God.
What, then, can we know about God if we have the wrong ideas in mind?
What good is having the right terms if we don’t know their proper meanings?

Here is the idea...

To say that God is all-powerful is not to say that he has what we have without limit.
But we can get something of the idea of God’s power from what we have.
We can consider the idea of a limit case.

The limit case of a polygon is a circle.
A circle is not a polygon at all.
But it is a limit case of a polygon.
We can begin to understand circle with reference to polygons.
Now consider power…

Review

Why do we not apply predicates to God and to man univocally?
Why not say that we equivocate instead?
What is St Thomas’s answer to this problem?
What is the difference between the sense and reference of a term?
Can we fully comprehend God? If not, then why not?
Can we, in a limited way, comprehend God? If so, then how so?